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Abstract
Background: Performance based financing (PBF) has been increasingly implemented across low and middle-
income countries, including in fragile and humanitarian settings, which present specific features likely to require
adaptation and to influence implementation of any health financing programme. However, the literature has been
surprisingly thin in the discussion of how PBF has been adapted to different contexts, and in turn how different
contexts may influence PBF. With case studies from three humanitarian settings (northern Nigeria, Central African
Republic and South Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo), we examine why and how PBF has emerged and
has been adapted to those unsettled and dynamic contexts, what the opportunities and challenges have been, and
what lessons can be drawn.
Methods: Our comparative case study is based on data collected from a document review, 35 key informant
interviews and 16 focus group discussions with stakeholders at national and subnational level in the three settings.
Data were analysed in order to describe and compare each setting in terms of underlying fragility features and
their implications for the health system, and to look at how PBF has been adopted, implemented and iteratively
adapted to respond to acute crisis, deal with other humanitarian actors and involve local communities.
Results: Our analysis reveals that the challenging environments required a high degree of PBF adaptation and
innovation, at times contravening the so-called ‘PBF principles’ that have become codified. We develop an
analytical framework to highlight the key nodes where adaptations happen, the contextual drivers of adaptation,
and the organisational elements that facilitate adaptation and may sustain PBF programmes.
Conclusions: Our study points to the importance of pragmatic adaptation in PBF design and implementation to
reflect the contextual specificities, and identifies elements (such as, organisational flexibility, local staff and
knowledge, and embedded long-term partners) that could facilitate adaptations and innovations. These findings
and framework are useful to spark a reflection among PBF donors and implementers on the relevance of
incorporating, reinforcing and building on those elements when designing and implementing PBF programmes.
Keywords: Performance based financing, Implementation process, Fragile and conflict-affected settings, DR Congo,
Central African Republic, Nigeria
* Correspondence: SWitter@qmu.ac.uk
1ReBUILD & Institute for Global Health and Development, Queen Margaret
University, Edinburgh, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Bertone et al. Conflict and Health  (2018) 12:28 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13031-018-0166-9
Background
Performance based financing (PBF) schemes aim to im-
prove health service delivery by providing bonuses to ser-
vice providers (usually facilities, but often with a portion
paid to individual staff) based on verified quantity of out-
puts produced, modified by quality indicators [1]. Such
programmes have been increasingly implemented across
low and middle income countries in the past decade with
considerable external financing from multilateral, bilateral
and global health initiatives [2]. Although it is clear from
the early studies that PBF is unlikely to be a homogenous
intervention and that its modalities and effects will be
dependent on context [3], the literature on PBF has been
surprisingly thin in its discussion of how different contexts
may influence PBF programmes [4]. In an effort to address
this gap, a recent hypothesis-led review, focussing on fra-
gile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) where PBF pro-
grammes have particularly proliferated, gathered the
existing evidence available in grey and published literature
on how the FCAS context may influence the adoption,
adaption, implementation and health system effects of
PBF [5]. The review found that evidence on the interaction
between PBF and context is still limited and pointed to
some critical issues that deserve further attention. In par-
ticular, it highlighted that, contrary to expectation, PBF de-
sign was relatively homogenous across FCAS settings,
with the notable exception that in humanitarian settings
some adaptations were emerging. As these adaptations are
only partially described in the grey literature and not ana-
lysed in published studies, they were deemed to merit in-
depth exploration, which is the objective of this paper.
The questions we address are of high policy relevance
as PBF continues to be used as a dominant financing
modality by donors, such as the World Bank [6] and re-
mains controversial [7]. Reflecting on how and why PBF
can be adapted to context (both at design and imple-
mentation stage), and on which are the factors enabling
such adaptations, is extremely relevant for the oper-
ational practice of PBF in all contexts. This is even truer
for FCAS, whose challenging environment poses specific
questions for adaptation and innovation. An estimated
125 million people worldwide are in need of humanitar-
ian support [8] with a growing number of conflicts,
many of which remain unresolved for years, leading to
long-term vulnerability for the populations in these
areas. At global level, there is increasing interest in ef-
fective financing mechanisms to support access to basic
services for conflict-affected populations [9], and this
article contributes to these academic and policy debates.
In this paper, using case studies from three humanitar-
ian settings – northern Nigeria, the Central African
Republic (CAR) and South Kivu in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) - we examine why and how
PBF has been adapted to those unsettled and dynamic
contexts, what the opportunities and challenges have
been, and what lessons can be drawn. In the absence of
sufficient data, we do not address the issue of whether
PBF is effective in humanitarian contexts; our study aims
to contribute to the literature on PBF design and imple-
mentation, rather than on its impact.
Methods
This research adopted a comparative case study design,
where the case studies allow exploring a phenomenon in
context (especially when the context is an integral part
of what is being studied) and the comparison
strengthens explanatory power and analytic generalis-
ability [10–12]. Data were collected through a review of
documents and a series of key informant interviews
(KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) in the three
settings. A common protocol was developed so that data
would be comparable across cases. The topic guide for
KIIs and FGDs, although tailored to each respondent,
group and setting, overall focused on the relation be-
tween fragility and health systems, the description of
PBF programme(s) and the process of their introduction
and development over time, challenges in implementa-
tion, and adaptations and innovations introduced at de-
sign or implementation stage to respond to conflict and
humanitarian crisis (Additional file 1).
Data collection
The document search targeted published and unpublished
documents that describe the PBF programmes, their de-
sign and implementation, provided information on effect-
iveness and/or challenges of the programme, and detailed
the adaptations made over time. Documents were re-
trieved through the database put together for the literature
review on PBF in fragile settings [5] to be reanalysed for
the purpose of this paper, but also through key informants
and direct knowledge of the context. Documents reviewed
included a few published articles, but were mostly unpub-
lished, health sector-related (e.g., policies and strategies)
and PBF project documents (e.g., implementation man-
uals, sample of contracts, list of indicators, internal and
external evaluations, presentations, annual reviews). In
total, 25 documents were reviewed for South Kivu, 24 for
Nigeria and 16 for CAR.
Ethics approval was obtained from Queen Margaret
University’s Research Ethics Panel, and fieldwork was
carried out between June and November 2017. FGDs
and KIIs were carried out in person in Nigeria (JT, NA),
remotely via phone, Skype or WhatsApp for DRC (MPB)
, and a mix of in-person KIIs and FGDs, and phone in-
terviews for CAR (EJ). The choice between FGDs and
KIIs was made based on what was best adapted to cap-
ture the elements included in the topic guide, as well as
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to take advantage of existing opportunities, such as
meetings already organised which gathered stakeholders.
Participants were identified through the document re-
view (e.g. authors of a report), as well as by contacting
the PBF implementing agency and/or the Ministry of
Health (MoH) in the relevant countries. A snowball
technique was also adopted by asking interviewees to
suggest others. In all settings, participants were selected
purposefully, with the aim of being as comprehensive as
possible, focusing on those involved in PBF design and/
or implementation and, where relevant and possible, also
other actors not directly involved in PBF but responsible
for service organisation and delivery in areas where PBF
operated. As much as possible, different levels of the
health system were included in the KIIs/FGDs. In DRC,
interviews focused on actors at provincial level in South
Kivu, although international respondents were also in-
cluded (e.g., consultants and project managers’ at head-
quarters). In CAR, respondents included international,
national and local (district) actors and in Nigeria, central
level decision-makers and members of the PBF project's
implementation unit in the MoH, managers of the
implementing agency at central level and staff at oper-
ational level, including MoH staff. In total, 34 KIIs and
18 FGDs were carried out. Table 1 provides a summary
of the FGDs and KIIs, and an overview of the character-
istics of the participants.
Data analysis
KIIs were recorded and/or detailed notes were taken
during interviews and FGDs, and analysis was carried out
based on those notes. Documents and notes from KIIs/
FGDs were manually analysed by the author/team
focusing on each setting (JT, NA for Nigeria, MPB for
DRC and EJ for CAR) using thematic analysis and based
on a list of predefined categories, which was developed
based on an existing study [13]. Summary reports were
prepared independently for each case study. During a
3-day workshop in October 2017, the research teams pre-
sented the findings for each country, which were charted
in a table with columns referring to cases and rows to ori-
ginal categories, also adding new categories/themes which
had emerged (Table 2). The table allowed comparative
analysis, highlighting differences and emerging patterns
across settings. The results section below is organised
following the categories of Table 2.
Results
Contexts
The underlying conflicts and features of fragility
All three settings have experienced intermittent conflict,
which is either on-going or in a fragile lull period. In the
East of the DRC, South Kivu, with a population of
around 5 million [14], has been heavily involved in the
First (1996–1997) and Second (1998–2003) Congo
Wars, and subsequently experienced protracted conflicts
and persisting violence, with a number of rebel forces
competing for political power and the control of natural
resources, including minerals and land [15]. Identity nar-
ratives, territorial claims and the influence of neighbour-
ing countries help perpetuate the conflict [16]. In this
study, we mostly focus on two among the 5 health zones
where PBF has been implemented (out of a total of 34
health zones in the province) – those of Shabunda and
Lulingu, which together form the administrative unit of
Shabunda territory, the largest and most isolated
Table 1 Summary of FGDs and KIIs carried out
Country Method Type of interviewees / participants Num. of KIIs / FGDs Total
DRC KIIs Implementing organisations 6 KIIs = 13
Consultants 2
Health administration at provincial and zonal level 3
Other organisations 2
CAR KIIs Implementing organisations 4 KIIs = 10
FGDs = 6
Consultants 2
Other organisations (international and national) 4
FGDs Health administration at national and district level 2
Other organisations 4
Nigeria KIIs Central level MoH decision-makers 3 KIIs = 12; FGDs =10
Implementing agency managers 3
Operational level – MoH and implementing agency 6
FGDs Central level MoH decision-makers 2
Implementing agency managers 4
Operational level – MoH and implementing agency 4
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territory of South Kivu. PBF was implemented in
Shabunda and Lulingu between 2008 and 2012, when the
area was moving towards (relative) peace and stability and
the main humanitarian health organisations had moved
out. Acute crises were only sporadic, but a few periods of
instability occurred especially around 2009 with increased
fighting and displacement of civilians [17].
Fragility features in South Kivu -and more broadly
across the DRC- include the quasi absence of state ser-
vices, such as justice, health care and security, for which
local populations have to rely on a network of state and
non-state actors [18]. Roads, communications, markets
and financial institutions are lacking or run-down, which
poses a challenge for service delivery but also for PBF.
CAR, which has a population of around 4.6 million [19],
also faces a protracted crisis with acute phases, including
at the moment in the North and East, where violence
flared up again in early 2017. Although the recent conflict
dates to the Séléka rebel coalition overthrow of the gov-
ernment in early 2013, instability has been raging at vary-
ing levels of intensity throughout CAR’s existence as an
independent country. The root causes include a scramble
over resources (diamonds, timber, gold, and land), fuelling
inter-communal violence, aggravated by historic griev-
ances and revenge [20, 21]. Economic tensions, including
between settled farmers and (neo-)pastoralists, have also
been reinforced by an instrumentalisation of religious and
ethnic differences and resentment against the former colo-
nial power, France, and the United Nations Multidimen-
sional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central
African Republic (MINUSCA).
Fragility in CAR brings similar challenges to South
Kivu and the country has been described as a ‘phantom
state’ [22] or ‘caricature of a state’ [23]. The extreme
deprivation and limited scale of financial services has
meant that cash is reported by key informants to have
almost disappeared from certain regions. Most of the
economy is informal, survival-based and even crimina-
lised in parts, which directly affects areas essential to
PBF such as drugs purchases.
Both DRC and CAR have been described as neo-
patrimonial, predatory states [24], in which power is fo-
cused on individuals and their protective networks
which extract resources as a source of power and control
[25]. Remoteness from the capital and lack of centralised
control or systems creates de facto local autonomy [26]
and the privatisation, or even de-institutionalisation, of
the public sphere [27].
Northern Nigeria has suffered from deepening insecur-
ity since 2009, as the result of the activities of Boko
Haram. Boko Haram means ‘western education is forbid-
den’, because of the group’s aversion to western civilisa-
tion, including western healthcare. The insurgency has
involved bombings, armed raids and robberies, rising in
intensity since 2012 [28, 29]. By 2017, over 20,000
people had been killed, more than 2 million displaced,
and over 6 million were in need of humanitarian assist-
ance [30]. The area saw a collapse in security and health
services, along with trade routes, markets, education and
many of the determinants of health, such as water, sani-
tation and food security. There was massive population
displacement into internally displaced persons (IDP)
camps. In this study, we focus on Adamawa State (popu-
lation of 4.5 million [31]), where PBF is implemented.
Here, the impact of Boko Haram’s activities was com-
pounded by political instability, with four different state
governors and executive councils taking power within
one year (mid-2014 to mid-2015). As in other settings,
the poorer populations were worst affected by the dis-
order, and poverty and political marginalisation of the
North within Nigeria remain as underlying risk factors.
Implications of conflict and fragility for the health systems
The effects of the conflict on the local health system had
many shared features across the three settings, although
the policy environment and responses differed (Table 3).
In South Kivu, the conflict had exacerbated pre-existing
health system’s weaknesses related to fragility and under-
funding, with low levels of staff training, drug stock-outs
and bad quality of drugs, poor governance and lack of
supervision of health facilities [32]. Particularly relevant is
the long-standing phenomenon of the “financement
ascendant” (also known as ‘la pompe’ - [33]) by which a
proportion of the earnings through user fees are levied on
facilities by the Zonal Health Management Team (ZHMT)
in order to support their own costs. Similarly, the provin-
cial authorities rely on the Zones for their funding.
Table 2 Pre-identified and emerging themes used for the
comparative analysis of case studies
Context Elements of the broader context
Nature of the conflict and fragility features
Pre-existing political settlements
Effects of conflict on health system
Formulation and
design of PBF
Period/duration of the PBF programme
Implementers and funders
PBF design and institutional arrangements
Facilities and services covered
Key actors and organisations driving or
blocking PBF introduction
Nature of the debate around the introduction
of PBF
Implementation
of PBF
Innovations/adaptations to PBF and coping
strategies in acute crisis
Coordination with other actors
Role of communities
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As a consequence of the volatile and instable situation,
in CAR by mid-2016 nearly half the population were in
need of humanitarian assistance and infrastructure was se-
verely damaged (see Table 3) [34, 35]. At central level, the
MoH was seen by key informants to have lost its leader-
ship role, with donors and NGOs left to pursue their own
objectives in an uncoordinated way. With external fund-
ing, a policy of free healthcare for women, children and
‘emergency’ services was instituted nationwide at the
height of the crisis, though later scaled down in stable
areas but still in place in the most insecure areas [36].
Additionally, key informants reported that the Central
Medical Store was not functioning due to mismanagement
and corruption and its future was uncertain, with stake-
holders holding competing visions for it.
In contrast with the other settings, Nigeria had a more
structured federal system with effective decentralisation
to state level for functions such as healthcare. Neverthe-
less, Adamawa State was already less developed in its
health system compared to other regions prior to the in-
surgency, and the conflict created huge damage [37, 38].
Despite the conflict, however, the central and state-level
administrations remain relatively functional and have
been attempting to strengthen the health system. In par-
ticular, the management and delivery of primary health
care (PHC) was reformed nationwide in 2011 to reduce
fragmentation following the “Primary Health Care Under
One Roof” policy, which established the creation of a
single State PHC Development Agency (SPHCDA), to
provide coordinated leadership [39].
Formulation and adoption of PBF programmes
Against these contexts, all characterised by extreme fra-
gility with phases of acute instability, the PBF pro-
grammes were designed and adopted. We describe these
processes here.
In South Kivu, discussions about the introduction of
PBF started around 2005–2006 and were led by the
Dutch NGO Cordaid (Caritas Netherlands) (and their
consultant), which had been implementing one of the
first PBF programmes in neighbouring Cyangugu prov-
ince, Rwanda. Initially, PBF covered 2 health zones
(Katana and Idjiwi – [40]) and was later expanded to
others (including Shabunda and Lulingu in 2008–2012),
covering a maximum of 5 health zones and a population
of 750,000 [41, 42]. As of mid-2017, Cordaid’s PBF pro-
ject has been discontinued, although PBF continues to
be implemented in South Kivu under other projects
(most notably, with World Bank’s funding). Cordaid’s
PBF project in South Kivu was funded largely by the
Dutch Embassy, but also from Cordaid’s own funds
and other donors, providing about 2–3 USD per
capita [17, 40]. Initially, Cordaid worked in collabor-
ation with the Diocesan Medical Bureau (Bureau
Diocésain d’Œuvres Médicales, BDOM), though this
was later changed as the BDOM was perceived to
have a conflict of interest since it is one of the major
health providers in the province. A new purchasing
agency (Agence d’Achat des Performances, AAP) was
created to implement the project, with the status of
national NGO, staffed by Congolese personnel and
funded by Cordaid1. The creation of a local AAP is
considered a ‘mixed arrangement’ and, at the time of
its conception, constituted an original feature of the
PBF project in South Kivu [43], in contrast to the
majority of the early PBF projects where the role was
played by the implementing NGO or by a unit at-
tached to the MoH. The combination of multiple
roles under the responsibility of the AAP was seen by
some key informants as against the PBF ‘principle’ of
separation of functions (by which it is understood “a
clear demarcation between purchasing, fund-holding,
[service] provision, regulation and community voice”
with the aim of reducing conflicts of interest and in-
creasing transparency and accountability ([1]: p.43)).
Key informants considered that it emerged and was
acceptable only in light of the difficult context in
which the project operated. Details of the PBF design
Table 3 Summary of implications of conflict and fragility for the health systems
South Kivu / DR Congo Central African Republic Adamawa State / Nigeria
National
governance
and leadership
• Conflict exacerbated pre-existing
weaknesses related to lack of
governance and underfunding
• MoH lost its leadership role to donors
and NGOs
• Structured federal system with effective
decentralisation
• Federal and state governments’
efforts to strengthen primary health
care delivery
Consequences
of conflict on
service delivery
• Violent episodes have left
infrastructure destroyed, equipment
pillaged and led to lack of staff in
some areas
• By 2016 27% of health facilities were partially
or fully destroyed, and of all functioning
facilities only 22% had a source of energy
and 43% running water
• Insurgency left only 37% of facilities
functional with limited staff, a break-
down in governance and facing
disease outbreaks
Healthcare
financing
• No fee exemption policies
(except for some vertically-funded
preventative services)
• Reliance on user fees and
external interventions
• Since 2014, externally funded free healthcare
policy for women (covering perinatal services),
children and ‘emergency’ services
• User fees in place generally, though
lifted at the height of the crisis in 2014
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and institutional arrangements in the three settings are
provided in Table 4. It is important to note that facilities
had a strong autonomy on most decisions concerning
their management, including on the use of PBF funds,
sharing of the performance-based payments and other in-
comes, the procurement of drugs and equipment as well
as hiring and firing of some staff (those paid with facility
revenues). The autonomy seems largely de facto and de-
rived from the history of state disengagement in funding
and managing the health sector [41].
In the documents reviewed, there is no evidence of a
debate on the suitability of PBF in South Kivu by local
stakeholders before its introduction, which may be
explained by the weakness of local institutions and also
the way in which NGOs tend to operate in conflict-
affected and humanitarian settings, where they compete
for donors’ funding and for influence on health author-
ities and tend to operate in parallel, not engaging each
other in debate about the relevance of their approach or
programme [43]. However, documents and KIIs contain
Table 4 Design features of the PBF programmes across the three settings
South Kivu / DR Congo Central African Republic Adamawa State / Nigeria
Funder(s) Dutch Embassy, Cordaid,
other donors (varying over time)
Current PBF programmes:
• European Union / Fonds Bekou
• World Bank (PASS)
World Bank
Period of
implementation
2005–2017 (with varying
geographical coverage)
• 2015-ongoing
• 2016-ongoing
End of 2011 - ongoing
Who is included/
incentivised?
– Facilities (primary and secondary;
public, private and faith-based)
– Zonal Health Management Teams (ZHMTs)
– Provincial authorities (later on)
– Facilities (primary and secondary;
public, private and faith-based)
– District Health Management
Teams (DHMTs)
– Regional and national health authorities
– [CHWs sub-contracted by health facilities
for outreach activities]
– Facilities (primary and secondary;
public and faith-based)
Indicators and
services included
(facility level)
Indicators and bonus attached varied over
time depending on budget available and
focus of donor(s). Overall, within the
national basic package of services for
primary and secondary levels.
The service package is harmonised
across PASS and Fonds Bekou programmes,
and based on the national basic package
Basic package, including vaccination,
assisted deliveries, consultations for
under-5s, quality of care
Institutional
arrangements:
Agency responsible:
- contracting Agence d’Achat des Performances (AAP)
for facilities and ZHMTs
(Cordaid for provincial level)
• Fonds Bekou: Cordaid
• PASS: international implementing
agencies (AEDES and Cordaid) for
facilities + MoH’s Project
Implementation Unit (PIU) for
health regulation
Project Implementation Unit (PIU)
within the State’s PHC Development
Agency (SPHCDA), with international
technical assistance from Oxford Policy
Management (OPM) for the first two
years before it started operating
autonomously
- quantitative
verification
AAP • Fonds Bekou: Cordaid
• PASS: international implementing
agencies (AEDES and Cordaid)
SPHCDA (initially with support
from international TA)
- qualitative
verification
ZHMTs/Provincial teams DHMTs SPHCDA (initially with support
from international TA)
- community
verification
Community Based Organisations,
contracted by AAP
Community Based Organisations,
contracted by implementing agencies
Grassroot NGOs/CSOs, contracted
by the SPHCDA
- fund-holding
and payment
AAP • Fonds Bekou: Cordaid
• PASS: PIU with the exception of 10%
of facilities which do not have bank
accounts and therefore are paid via
the implementing agencies.
SPHCDA
Fee exemptions
for vulnerable
populations
Initially not planned, but were later
introduced [42]. Project’s evaluations
noted that they were largely
not functioning [41, 47]
• Yes for PASS project only (KII; [44]). Introduced in Adamawa State only
Equity bonus
across areas
No • PASS: indigents are exempted from
fee-paying, for which health facilities
are compensated. Identification of indigents
is done at community level without
standardised criteria.
No
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several post-hoc justifications of why PBF was suitable in
the context of South Kivu. Explanations relate to the ab-
sence of state funding [43], as well as to the perceived
pre-existing entrepreneurial ‘franchise’ fashion of service
delivery given the state’s absence [41] and to the de facto
autonomy of providers, which allows PBF to be designed
and to operate more freely (KII).
In CAR, PBF has been implemented since 2009 through
a series of pilots, also led by Cordaid. At the time of this
study, two main projects were ongoing. The first is sup-
ported by the European Union (Fonds Bekou pooled fund-
ing) since 2015 and implemented by Cordaid, covering
about 341,600 people, while the second is the World
Bank-funded Projet d’Appui au Système de la Santé (PASS)
which started in 2016. Under the leadership of the
Ministry of Health’s Project Implementation Unit (PIU),
two international agencies are responsible for PASS imple-
mentation – Cordaid (which covers a population of 1.2
million) and AEDES (0.5 million). PASS has a budget of 5
USD per capita, compared to € 11 per capita for the EU/
Fonds Bekou-funded PBF (KII; [44]).
In terms of PBF adoption process, it is evident from
our interviews that the early PBF pilots and the lead
consultant (the same person as in South Kivu) played a
key role in influencing MoH staff at high level, including
the Minister. However, other actors retained divergent
perspectives. While the World Bank is seen by key infor-
mants as extremely supportive of PBF (also given its role
in financing and supporting PBF in other countries –
[5]), the European Union remained neutral (indeed, the
Fonds Bekou funds multiple projects in the health
sector, of which only one is a PBF scheme) and other in-
stitutions -such as the World Health Organisation- were
viewed as largely unsupportive. However, there was
limited debate before PBF introduction and the pro-
grammes went ahead. After its introduction, there was
some opposition in particular from humanitarian NGOs,
which saw PBF as unsuitable for a FCAS. Opposition to
PBF was also voiced by those who oppose charging user
fees for service delivery (which in CAR was seen as in-
compatible with PBF by most stakeholders on both sides
of the argument) and those in favour of the re-
establishment of the Central Medical Store (which was
also seen as incompatible with PBF by many).
In Nigeria, PBF was introduced as a pilot at the end of
2012 with funding from the World Bank and is due to
continue until mid-2018. The pilot covers three States
(Adamawa, Nasarawa and Ondo) with a combined popu-
lation of 11.6 million and a per capita budget of 14 USD
[45]. In Nigeria, the process of PBF introduction was
somewhat different, though still initially dominated by
external players. The World Bank (through consultants)
presented the approach in December 2011, and a study
tour to Rwanda for Nigerian government stakeholders
was funded. The MoH bought into the idea as a viable op-
tion to strengthen its new PHC policy. However, it recog-
nised that the model had to be substantially adapted to
the specificities of the Nigerian context, and in particular
its decentralisation (Table 4 presents further information
on the PBF programme design).
Implementation of PBF
Innovations and adaptations of PBF, and strategies to cope
with acute crisis
Our analysis revealed a number of adaptations which
were made to the PBF projects in order to address the
challenges due to the complex contexts in which they
operated, in particular during violent periods. They are
described in Table 5 below.
Additionally in South Kivu, we noted that (beyond
the adaptations related to the acute crisis in Shabunda
and Lulingu health zones described in Table 5), other
innovations emerged more broadly, linked to the gen-
eral fragility and ‘statelessness’. As the project evolved,
extensive contracting was developed for the regulatory
authorities at zonal and provincial level directly with
the AAP or Cordaid, rather than between levels of the
health hierarchy. This was seen by many key informants
as a way to fund these agencies (which receive little or
no public funding) and eliminate the need for finance-
ment ascendant [43], but - it appears - also to deal with
the absence of the state, by bypassing and substituting
central-level authorities and gaining more direct con-
trol of the activities at provincial and zonal levels. PBF
was also later expanded to other sectors, including edu-
cation, roads/infrastructure, and justice and security
[41, 46] by contracting service providers (schools and
teachers, communities engaged in construction and re-
habilitation, courts and police), but also the relevant
administrative authorities up to the provincial gover-
norate. Initially, the rationale was that these sectors
were considered as bottlenecks for health service deliv-
ery, but later on the conceptualisation broadened to in-
clude an explicit ‘state-building’ function beyond
service delivery, under the “Approche PBF pour le
renforcement de l’Etat” (PBF for state-building) project,
which covered all those sectors [47]. Interestingly, the
AAP states its mission is “to promote the social con-
tract between the state and communities in ensuring
access of citizens to quality social services, through the
promotion of the PBF approach” ([48]:p.5). While some
examples exist in other settings of PBF in education
and water and sanitation sectors, to our knowledge
such broad extension of PBF, both in operational and in
conceptual terms, was unique to South Kivu. The ex-
perience was relatively short lived, pursued somewhat
‘intuitively’ and pragmatically by Cordaid [47], and little
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Table 5 PBF innovations and adaptations during crisis
South Kivu / DR Congo Central African Republic Adamawa State / Nigeria
Coping with
acute crisis
(Shabunda and Lulingu health zones in 2009):
“Stay put” (rather than evacuate personnel)
to build local trust and relations with the
authorities in health and other sectors, but
also with rebel forces when needed. The
AAP was composed of local staff with
established knowledge in the area, which
may have helped with this strategy (KIIs)
Negotiations with all sides, including
armed groups (tactics included offering
free care to armed groups although this
became more challenging as violence
intensified).
• Few managers continued to provide
health services to the non-displaced
populations in conflict-affected areas,
and later claimed PBF subsides
• Creation of 5 PBF-funded mobile clinics
to provide services in conflict-affected
areas, with ‘hit and run’ approach
– moving to key spots when the situation
allowed to deliver first-line care and
transferring critical cases to facilities
in safer areas.
• Armed hunters trained to carry out
community health worker functions for
those who had remained in the villages.
Procurement Direct procurement of drugs and
equipment for facilities, given the
absence of functioning markets
(Fonds Bekou) Direct procurement of
drugs and materials for facilities via a
faith-based supplier, given the absence
of functioning markets or Central
Medical Store (this happened despite
the stark debate going on in Bangui in
which PBF was seen as incompatible
with ‘push’ procurement systems) (KIIs)
Drugs purchased and imported from
neighbouring Cameroon. PBF funding used
to pre-finance drugs and essential supplies,
later reimbursed with non-performance
based cash transfers by other donors
Staff recruitment – (Fonds Bekou) Cordaid directly helped
facilities to recruit qualified staff, given
shortages and the underdeveloped
labour market
Nationwide, the State agency for PHC
recruited specific PBF staff.
In Adamawa State, additional health
staff was recruited for the mobile clinics
Funding rehabilitation
and construction
• Flexible provision of non-performance
based, advance funding (bonus de
demarrage), not paid in cash but used
by AAP to purchase construction
materials not available locally
• Mobilising communities’ labour and
locally-available materials
(sand, stones, bricks) ([41]; KIIs).
Under both Fonds Bekou and PASS
programmes: direct support for
rehabilitation and construction.
• Fonds Bekou: more space for
non-performance based funding
• PASS: requests can be made to a
‘quality improvement fund’. However,
several key informants perceived
these measures to be insufficient
since, given the badly functioning
markets and the low number and
skills of staff, funds are often
underutilised and inputs,
rather than cash, was seen as
more effective in such context
(KIIs; FGDs).
WB-funded PBF programme and
other (non-PBF) programmes funded
rehabilitation and construction,
once Boko Haram had left the area.
PBF payment Cash to facilities in absence of
banking infrastructure.
AAP staff distributed PBF payments
to facility staff during zonal meetings or
carried cash to facilities,
at high personal risk (KIIs).
Cash to facilities in absence
of banking infrastructure
Cash payments when no banking
facility is available
PBF verification Payments without verification (KIIs) Payments were made at times
without verification
Payments at times made
without verification (FDG)
Dealing with
internally displaced
populations (IDPs)
Free care provided to about 20,000 IDPs.
Free care was subsidised by increasing
by 10–40% the PBF bonus for facilities
most affected ([61]; KIIs)
Free care to IDPs in
emergency areas.
Nearby facilities used PBF funds to
sub-contract newly set-up clinics
operating in IDP camps.
Teams of 4–5 health workers living
in the IDP camps or purposefully
transferred from the SPHCDA
were subcontracted to staff these
outreach clinics, where care was
provided for free to registered IDPs.
Thanks to the PBF programme,
a system to register IDPs was developed.
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work exists to evaluate whether it represented a suc-
cessful attempt to reinforce the state (though admit-
tedly only focused on local level institutions) or is not
sustainable in the long term (KII).
Underlying all the innovations (both those listed in
Table 5 and those described above) in South Kivu was
the small-scale and NGO-led nature of the projects
which allowed for flexibility during design and imple-
mentation. Key informants recognised that such flexibil-
ity was critical to the survival (and, in their views, the
success) of the project, given the dynamic and fragile
setting. In CAR, more flexibility was allowed in the
Fonds Bekou programme, whereas the PASS project had
a more rigid operating manual. Despite that, as Table 5
shows, even under PASS, implementers had to introduce
some degree of adaptation to cope with the complex
environment. In Nigeria, the approach of the PBF
programme since inception had been that of ‘learning by
doing’, where (in contrast with the cases of CAR and
South Kivu) state-level (SPHCDA and MoH) staff took a
substantive lead with some support from international
technical assistance. Boko Haram’s insurgency meant
that further adjustments were needed in Adamawa State
to cope with insecurity and shifting populations.
Coordination with other actors
Lack of coordination was a theme that emerged promin-
ently in the interviews on South Kivu, particularly
concerning coordination between development and hu-
manitarian NGOs, which were seen as bypassing rules
and procedures and putting in place short-term mea-
sures, such as providing free services which could be
disruptive in the longer term [25]. Most interviewees
told of clashes with humanitarian organisations, which
happened during the 2009 crisis in Shabunda, when a
humanitarian NGO returned with the intention of bring-
ing in expatriate staff and providing free care for the en-
tire population, even if only for a brief period, to the
same area where Cordaid was supporting facilities with
cash under the PBF project and another development
NGO was providing drugs and commodities. After
lengthy negotiations, a division of areas of influence was
agreed, with the humanitarian NGO supporting three fa-
cilities and providing free services, and the development
NGOs continuing their programmes in the remaining fa-
cilities, where fees were levied to the resident population
but with IDPs exempted (KIIs).
Similar ideological tensions and coordination failures
were reported in CAR, which in some cases resulted in
duplication of support to some facilities (KII; FGD).
However, there were also examples of practical cooper-
ation on the ground, such as collaboration in the logis-
tics of drug procurement and distribution, division of
tasks in districts covered by multiple actors (e.g. Cordaid
contracting health centres, where MSF is supporting the
district hospital, and Cordaid providing output-based,
PBF support to health facilities that the Red Cross sup-
ports with inputs) (KII; FGD).
The experience in Adamawa State presents a different
case. There, the strong local leadership provided by the
SPHCDA enabled tensions between different actors and
approaches to be overcome and ensured multi-sectoral
and coordinated responses. Monthly meetings were
organised by the SPHCDA (responsible for PBF imple-
mentation), which included also donors (such as, IOM,
IRC, ICRC) in charge of providing humanitarian assist-
ance, and the (re)definition of roles and responsibilities
linked to PBF structures helped practitioners set up
some measure of order in a chaotic conflict environment
(FGD; [49]). For example, a ‘single data registry’ was de-
veloped to register IDPs to enable PBF verification, but
was also useful to other agencies to provide services and
avoid duplication of care.
Role of communities
One of the initial hypotheses for PBF in fragile settings
was that, given the lack of state structures and funding as
well as the programme focus at community level (for
example, through community verification and the health
committees in CAR and South Kivu), PBF could be
effective in reinforcing social accountability links at the
local level. In fact, no evidence of this emerged in the three
contexts analysed. This is possibly due to the fact that local
accountability was poorly defined [47] and the expecta-
tions were perhaps too ambitious -that communities could
play a variety of roles, such as verification, participation,
lobbying for population rights, supervision and conflict
mediation – in particular given the disruption of commu-
nities and community cohesion during acute crises.
However, the role of communities emerged in different
ways, in particular in South Kivu where communities were
involved by the AAP to support the rehabilitation of
health facilities (as well as schools, roads and other infra-
structures). A key informant stressed that the consider-
ation that staff and communities had for ‘their’ health
centre during conflict and violence was different between
the PBF facilities (that they had contributed to build, re-
habilitate and purchase equipment for) compared to other
facilities where equipment was given as inputs by donors.
In the first case, staff would hide and protect equipment,
while in the latter there were instances where such equip-
ment was lost, stolen or sold.
Discussion
Conflict-affected, insecure and fast-changing contexts
are not on the face of it promising environments to im-
plement PBF. It is therefore interesting to understand
how and why PBF is being adopted in such settings, and
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how it is adapted to them. Our study provides a first
exploration of these questions in three humanitarian set-
tings and builds on an earlier study which analysed the
inter-relationship between PBF and FCAS contexts [5] .
The analysis reveals interesting patterns across the cases,
but also important differences. In the discussion, we
identify the key emerging elements and organise them in
an analytical framework (Fig. 1), which helps to highlight
the key nodes where adaptations happen, the contextual
drivers of adaptation, and the organisational elements
that enable or facilitate adaptation and may sustain PBF
programmes, focusing on ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ ele-
ments of the health system [50].
The inner circle in Fig. 1 presents the PBF ‘principles’
(i.e., autonomy for health facilities, payment according
to verified performance, contractual relationships, sep-
aration of functions, community engagement, equity
bonuses), as they have become codified over time
[2, 51, 52]. These PBF ‘principles’ have helped to iden-
tify functions and roles, and also to promote PBF as a
coherent approach, building on experience as imple-
mentation progressed across countries. However, the
rigid codification of PBF carries a risk in terms of fossil-
isation of the approach which becomes less adaptable
to context.
The second concentric circle in Fig. 1 highlights that,
despite the ‘principles’, PBF can be, and has been,
adapted in a pragmatic way to respond to the specific-
ities of local contexts (the ‘contextual drivers of adapta-
tion’ are represented in the third circle in Fig. 1). The
challenging environments that we analysed did require a
high degree of adaptation and innovation, and we found
a number of examples in our analysis (in Fig. 1, exam-
ples are mapped against the principles they contravene
by using the same colour). Our cases show that: func-
tions have been combined where reliable institutions to
carry them out were lacking; contracting of the local
regulator by implementing agencies was introduced as a
measure to cope with the absent central state; changes
have been made to verification procedures including
foregoing verification when it was risky to carry it out;
non-performance based, and in some cases input-based,
support was provided under the PBF programme (rather
than in parallel by other programmes) for the rehabilita-
tion and construction of destroyed infrastructure; and
direct intervention of the implementers for the procure-
ment of drugs and supplies (sometimes in collaboration
with other NGOs) or for hiring staff occurred in the ab-
sence of functioning markets. Adaptations have also
been made to respond to crisis by providing free care to
Fig. 1 Adaptations of PBF in three humanitarian settings, their drivers and facilitators. Source: inner circle [52]; outer circles: authors, based on
study findings. Examples of “PBF adaptations”, and their respective “contextual drivers”, are mapped against PBF principles by using the same
colour; “contextual drivers” in grey, dotted lines are general ones. “Organisational facilitators” also refer generally to all adaptations
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IDPs, even in contexts where free care is not an official
government policy. Where communities had been dis-
rupted by violence and displacement, their engagement
and contracting for verification did not work as envis-
aged (similarly to other contexts [53]), but communities
were contracted in other pragmatic ways to support
health service delivery, for example by providing labour
and materials for reconstruction and rehabilitation of fa-
cilities. Some of these adaptations have also been ob-
served in other countries. For example, in Sierra Leone
during the Ebola epidemic payments were done without
verification [54], and increasing PBF bonus to subsidise
free care for IDPs in South Kivu represented an early ex-
ample of what is now a practice in other PBF projects, in-
cluding for example in CAR and Cameroon [51, 55, 56].
However, the literature so far rather reports these adapta-
tions but has not analysed them in relation to the humani-
tarian and crisis context.
It is also relevant to explore what enabled and facili-
tated these adaptations (highlighted in the outer ring of
Fig. 1). Our analysis shows that the decision space and
the margin of manoeuvre to adapt available to imple-
menters is affected by their funder(s)’ requirements and
funding levels, but also by their organisational capacities,
technical knowledge, interface with communities, social
accountability, individual influences, and importantly
national leadership. We find that, in difficult environ-
ments, the risk related to PBF implementation is pushed
on to the implementing organisations. As a result, they
can only survive if they draw on their resources, which
include financial, but also technical and relational (local
organisation, trust and knowledge). In particular, organ-
isational flexibility, in terms of budget levels, budget use
but also mindsets, management structures and innovation
capacity plays a key role in allowing adaptations and
changes to PBF in order to cope with the challenges.
Similarly, long-term relationships within the area and
local staff with good contextual knowledge and links
also proved to be essential. In our case studies in South
Kivu and CAR, Cordaid appears to have built consider-
able social capital, which it was able to draw on for
protection and continued functioning, especially when
the PBF programme’s rules and regulations allowed for
more flexibility in adaptation. In northern Nigeria, the
recognised leadership of the local government agency
in charge of PBF implementation was essential to en-
sure a coordinated and adapted response to the crisis.
PBF also provided a ‘structure’ based on the
distribution of roles and functions that PBF entailed,
that helped the SPHCDA to organise, coordinate and
support the provision of healthcare services, during the
crisis and especially in the IDP camps.
In contrast with the Nigerian context, in the environ-
ments of CAR and South Kivu, governance is marked by
multiple actors, power imbalances, fragmentation, and
competing agendas [18]. The lack of well-defined and
effectively enforced policies creates a de facto policy (and
financing) void at local level, which allows PBF to be
adapted and implemented more freely. In these contexts,
PBF is not necessarily clashing with the (absent) policies
and strategies, for example, concerning facility autonomy
and use of funds, in contrast to what noted in other
countries, such as Cameroon [57]. However, given the
fragmentation of funding flows and the competition for
funding, clash and negotiations occur between PBF imple-
menters and other external players. Additionally, in the
political void, PBF implementers with resources can be-
come ‘policy-makers’ themselves, by contracting the local
authorities and contributing to (re)define their roles and
tasks, as in South Kivu. This approach may be effective to
ensure funding and (some) accountability, and therefore
improve service delivery, but its longer term legacy on
state-building is less well documented. We recognise,
however, that this is an alternative to other approaches to
dealing with the challenges related to the weakness and
underfunding of the local state, which are also sub-
optimal. Other options include bypassing the higher (pro-
vincial) authorities to deal directly with the Zones or even
the facilities, as done by most humanitarian actors [58].
This creates tensions at facility level and further weakens
the provincial authorities. Another option is to select one
or few individual champion(s) with extensive patronage
networks or political weight and motivate them (finan-
cially or otherwise) to push the donors’ or NGOs’ agenda
- again bypassing formal institutions and reinforcing the
patronage system [25].
Additionally, in the case of South Kivu and CAR,
alongside the “privatisation from within” [26], the weak-
ness of local institutions and lack of ‘veto points’ from
public authorities may have also contributed to making
the introduction of PBF concepts relatively easy. Indeed,
we find that, in those cases, processes of PBF adoption
were externally driven, as highlighted in the literature in
particular with reference to fragile states [5, 59, 60].
Nigeria presents a different context as the federal
authorities and structures remained in place and only
parts of the country were conflict-affected. As a conse-
quence, the introduction of PBF in Nigeria was more
formally directed, and the MoH leadership was strong
enough to demand national ownership.
Our study has certain limitations. In terms of data col-
lection, because participants’ identification was based on
initial contacts provided by implementing agencies,
some degree of respondent bias is possible. Generally,
the sample is unbalanced towards those involved in PBF
implementation rather than their counterparts, although
we did try to capture the views of other organisations
operating in the area and of the MoH at different levels.
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Additionally, our focus was essentially on central/federal
and state/provincial levels, as well as district/zonal
where possible, but we did not capture the views of the
service providers or of the communities they served. Fi-
nally, because of lack of specific data on the effects of
PBF on health outcomes and health system elements, we
were not able to complete the last element of the study
which was guiding us, relating to effects [13]. Overall,
this study remains exploratory in nature.
Conclusions
This study explores the introduction and implementa-
tion of PBF in three conflict-affected settings: South
Kivu in the DRC, the CAR, and Adamawa State in
northern Nigeria. It looks at how and why PBF is
adopted in such settings, how it is adapted to them,
what drives and what facilitates these adaptations. The
case studies and their comparison provide relevant
insights on a largely unexplored topic, which is of high
importance for improving both our theoretical under-
standing of PBF and its operational practice.
In particular, our study adds to the literature on PBF
implementation, with specific attention to the influence
of context and contextual adaptations, which has been
very rarely discussed in the literature so far. The findings
point to the importance of pragmatic adaptation in PBF
design and implementation that is necessary to reflect
the specificities of each context. While conflict-affected
settings represent an extreme case of challenging envi-
ronments (which perhaps explains why adaptations are
made, while PBF programmes in other settings appear
more rigid), further research could confirm that our
conclusions are applicable beyond these contexts. In par-
ticular, the elements that we identified as facilitating or
enabling adaptations (such as organisational flexibility,
local staff and knowledge, and embedded long-term
partners) appear to be relevant across settings. They are
useful to spark a reflection among PBF donors and im-
plementers on the relevance of incorporating, reinfor-
cing and building on those elements when designing and
implementing PBF programmes. Additionally, although
the elements identified in our cases are likely to be
context-specific, the structure of the framework that we
develop could represent a useful tool for further analyt-
ical work in different contexts.
Endnotes
1It is interesting to note that, even if Cordaid’s health
PBF programme in South Kivu has been discontinued,
the AAP retains its purchasing role for PBF in other
sectors, and also for the new World Bank-funded PBF
programme in the health sector.
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